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Abstract 
Scenarios are valuable tools that could support decision making under deep uncertainty, nevertheless, their potential remains untapped. The 
paper explores whether participatory scenario construction in the form of stories coupled with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) 2100 projections may contribute to increased utility of the scenarios and projections for climate-induced risk reduction, in the Nile 
Basin. The Nile River is 6,695 kilometres long and covers a basin area of 3.18 million square kilometres (one-tenth of the African land mass). 
The basin is highly susceptible to climate-change induced disasters. According to the IPCC, there is high confidence that the Basin will suffer 
from severe shifts in biome distribution, compounded water stress, degradation of marine life and reduced crop productivity. There is also 
medium confidence that the Nile Basin will experience: severe decline in livestock, significant increase in vector and water-borne diseases, 
undernutrition, increased migration and sea level rise. The basin is already experiencing some of these key risks, on the other hand, their impact 
in the next 30 to 35 years is deeply uncertain. The findings of this paper are based on four scenarios, namely: Kazuri, Miskeen, Umoja and 
EjoHeza and data collected from two forums that were held in Jinja, Uganda and Nairobi, Kenya. The forum participants were a multi-
disciplinary team of national and international stakeholders. The paper concludes that coupling Nile Basin storylines with the IPCC 2100 
projections, proved to be an effective tool in increasing the utility of the scenarios and projections, for purposes of disaster risk reduction. 
Future work will entail analysing the uptake of the scenarios to resolve deadlocks and enhance cooperation. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of HumTech2016 
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1. Introduction 
The Nile is derived from the Greek word Neilos: Neilos was the River God of Ancient Egypt. The lives of the Nile Basin 
citizens are woven around the Nile and it is a source of their economic, social and cultural well-being. Being the longest river in 
the world, with a length of 6,695 kilometres, it is located between the coordinates -4oS to 31oN and 24oE to 40oE. Its basin area 
occupies one-tenth of Africa in the Central, East, North and Horn of Africa regions. The basin area is 3,176,543 km3. Its mean 
annual flow is 84 billion cubic meters per annum at the Aswan High dam. Though it is the longest river in the world, it does not 
have a very high annual flow because its main source of water is highly seasonal. The basin’s highest point is 5,110 meters 
(Rwenzori Mountains in Uganda) whereas its lowest point is -133 meters (Qattara Depression in Egypt). In 2012, the Nile 
countries population was 437 million and 54 per cent of this population (238 million) lives in the basin area. The land use in 2009 
comprised of shrublands and woodlands (37.3 percent), bare soils (30.8 percent), agricultural land (11.6 percent), grasslands 
(10.6 percent), forests (6.9 percent), water bodies (3.0 percent), and built-up areas (0.1 percent). The main Nile water use is 
agriculture (78 percent of the peak flow at the Aswan high dam). Due to climate change, the future of the basin is becoming 
 thors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://cr ativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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increasingly uncertain. As a consequence, Nile decision-makers are constantly looking for tools and approaches that would 
support their decision-making process under deep uncertainty. 
Scenarios (a set of plausible long-term futures) are useful in supporting decision-making under deep uncertainty [1]. Despite 
the growing acceptance of the importance of scenarios, their potential has barely been tapped. In this paper, we explore whether 
the development of the Nile Basin climate-change risk scenarios and coupling them with IPCC model-based projections [2] may 
increase knowledge on climate-induced risk reduction. Scenarios were selected because they can facilitate change of mind-frames 
from business as usual towards targeted solutions to the current climate change challenges [3]. Scenarios also have the potential 
to bridge the gap between scientists, water managers and policy makers. Thereby, increasing their uptake by the decision makers. 
However, to increase their uptake, as explained by Enserink et al. (2013), the scenario developers have to embrace uncertainty 
and thereafter communicate this to the decision makers [4]. Thissen et al. (2015) furthers the argument by stating that current 
uncertainties are downplayed when a political decision is urgently needed or overemphasized when avoiding political action.  As 
a way forward, Thissen et al. (2015) proposes “a tailored combination of different approaches … combining more top-down 
measures with bottom-up approaches” [5]. In this paper, we have applied Thissen’s recommendation through the coupling of the 
IPCC projections, with the Nile Basin storylines. 
We selected the storyline form of scenario construction which describes how a particular future may unfold in the form of a 
consistent story. Storylines are an effective tool that can guide decision makers in the policy making process and provide a basis 
for modellers to make numerical estimates. Storylines can also be coupled with existing climate-change environmental models so 
as to increase the impact of both. Garb et. al (2008) states that “scenarios are social objects,” yet in practice more attention is paid 
to the numerical results that are derived from the storyline rather than the story and process of scenario construction.   Garb et. al 
(2008) adds that there has been insufficient coupling of the environmental models and storylines. The two are meant to strengthen 
one another so as to build a strong case for climate change risk reduction. Unfortunately, they have been disseminated and used 
separately, with very limited interweaving. He further stresses that scenarios are powerful tools of influence and this influence 
occurs not only when there is a knowledge change but also when there is a change in problem framing. Locally understood 
metaphors, phrases, names, images and even language can significantly increase the uptake of already existing environmental 
models [6]. Linking IPCC to local names like Umoja, Kazuri, Miske en and Ejo Heza, easily communicates the message to the 
Nile Basin policy makers, in a language that they are familiar with. In addition, a Nile Basin policy maker would pay more 
attention to scenarios developed by his or her constituents rather than scenarios developed by a panel of experts, even though 
both could be containing the same message. On the basis of these considerations, we selected storyline scenarios and interweaved 
them with the IPCC climate change projections 2000 to 2100 (for Africa), so as to increase the utility of both, as decision support 
tools. 
2. The Scenario Development Process and Results 
2.1. The Scenario Development Forum 
The scenarios were developed according to the RAND Corporation methodology, also known as the ‘Shell-scenarios’ 
methodology [7]. The RAND methodology is a step by step process of working with key stakeholders to develop scenarios. In 
this methodology, the first step is the determination of the core question and then the contextual factors and thereafter clustering 
the contextual factors. The clustering of the contextual factors leads to the group determination of the driving forces. The driving 
forces are then ranked and based on the ranking, some driving forces are selected to develop the scenario logic. After the 
scenario logic is constructed, the stakeholders develop storylines around various scenarios. The refinement of the storylines takes 
a longer period and involves an iterative process where the storylines are subjected to existing data on the subject-area so as to 
ensure that they are plausible. After the completion of the storyline development process, the storylines are subjected to a 
validation process before being considered complete. This process is illustrated in Fig. 1 and explained, in detail, in this sub-
section. 
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Fig. 1. The scenario development process. 
The scenarios are known as the Nile Basin scenarios by 2050. They were developed in a scenario workshop titled “Futures 
Planning for The Restoration of Ecosystem Services through Participatory Nile Basin Scenario Construction.” The workshop was 
held in Jinja Uganda on the 11 to the 13 February 2014. The specific workshop objective was to develop storylines of plausible 
futures for the Nile Basin by 2050. The Workshop participants were 24 persons, who represented the ten riparian states and 
formed a multi-disciplinary group of experts and stakeholders from basin, sub-basin, national and international organizations. 
After the workshop, there was a process of refining the storylines. Thereafter, the scenarios were presented to Nile Basin policy 
makers and other stakeholders during the Nile Day celebrations held in Kampala, Uganda on the 21st of February 2014 and the 
Nile Basin Development Forum held on 6 and 7 October 2014. During the Nile Basin Development Forum, the scenarios were 
presented to all the Ministry of Water Ministers from the Nile Basin riparian states, their water managers and over 400 Nile 
Basin stakeholders.  
The main question identified by the participants was: What are the plausible future changes in the Nile Basin by 2050. 
Determining the question took longer than we had envisaged. This is because we had a multi-disciplinary group from all over the 
basin and other development actors. To determine the question, we organised brief sessions for Nile Basin expert presentations 
on what in their opinion are the main issues. Thereafter the participants deliberated and integrated their knowledge, experience 
and the information they had received from the Nile Basin experts, so as to determine the core question. 
After determining the core question, the participants brainstormed in four groups and developed a list of factors that are 
impacting the Nile Basin system, leading to a joint list of contextual factors that influence Nile basin. Then the contextual factors 
were clustered into driving forces. Through different sequential steps, and reaching consensus after each step, the list of 
contextual factors were scrutinized, reduced and grouped. Consequently, groups agreed, based on the clusters, on the driving 
forces behind the changes in these factors.  As a result, causal relations were distinguished and sources of change identified. 
From the list of contextual factors, six main driving forces were agreed upon. The six main drivers for change were: Governance; 
Population growth; Information/capacity/knowledge; Socio-economic development needs; Climate variability and change and 
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Fig. 2. Deconstruction of the scoping process: 89 factors >38 clusters of factors > 6 forces driving change. 
After reaching an agreement on what were the driving forces, the participants ranked these driving forces, according to their 
importance, relative impact on the Nile Basin system and their level of uncertainty. The ranking was done through an individual 
voting system (Fig. 3). 
 
 
Fig. 3. Ranking driving forces - development needs, climate change, energy, governance, population and information. 
 
Based on the ranking, the participants agreed to focus their scenario logic on these three key driving forces: governance, 
climate change and information. Climate change was preferred over socio-economic development needs because of the 
uncertainty of its impacts. Based on the three driving forces, a scenario logic was constructed. Thereafter, the participants 
developed a table (Table 1) that illustrates all the different plausible futures. From the table, the participants selected the 
candidate scenarios that they will detail out, from the group of eight plausible futures. The best and worst case scenarios were not 
selected because the participants wanted to further define a consistent and plausible future. Two other scenarios that were 
eliminated incorporated responsive governance and weak information sharing. This was found, by the participants, not to be 
consistent because one key component of responsive governance is a strong and functional information management system. 
Table 1. Selection of the candidate scenarios. 




Climate change resilience Non-resilient Resilient Non-resilient Resilient 
Information sharing No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Decision Worst case 
OUT 







By having short pitches during the story writing the groups were able to come to a set of matching names and rudimentary 
storylines.  The four scenarios were named: Kazuri, Miskeen, Umoja and EjoHeza. Thereafter, the group agreed on the 
terminology and the three axis for the scenario logic: “Governance” (from non-responsive/non-adaptive to responsive and 
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adaptive), “Information sharing and knowledge” (from not shared/restricted to shared and applied); and “Climate change:” (from 




Fig. 4. The scenario logic. 
The detailed scenarios are structured around the rationale, methods and drivers that we have already described earlier, in this 
paper. The four scenarios are not the best or the worst case scenarios; they represent some emerging potential opportunities, 
strengths, weaknesses and even threats that the Nile Basin may face in the near future. The initial storylines were edited and 
detailed by the workshop facilitators in cooperation with the workshop participants. Based on the detailed storylines, the 
feedback received during the Nile Day celebrations and the Nile Basin Development forum, we were able to assess the 
contribution of the Nile Basin scenarios to the reduction of risks that may result from future climate induced disasters. 
3. Coupling Nile Basin 2050 Scenarios with the IPCC 2100 Scenarios 
Each of the four Nile Basin scenarios is an illustration of the potential benefits and the potential negative consequences of 
pursuing a particular trajectory (Fig. 5). Two scenarios are proactive in nature (Ejo Heza and Kazuri). What triggers the 
stakeholders to action, in the two scenarios, are climate-change induced disasters. What differentiates the two scenarios is the 
governance mode that is adopted to address the social problem. In one the collective action is at all levels, but engineered using 
top down approaches (Ejo Heza), whereas the other governance mode focuses on horizontal networks with limited bottom up and 
top down interventions (Kazuri).  In Miskeen, the states are not cooperating, because non-cooperation enables them to maximize 
their outcomes [8]. However, these outcomes are maximized in the short-term and ultimately diminish.  In Umoja, the 11 riparian 
states unite into one supra-national institution known as the United Nile Republic, to address the climate induced risks and jointly 
manage the Nile Basin water resources. 
 
Fig. 5. The benefits and risks of the 4 scenarios. 
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Upon completion, the four scenarios were presented during the Nile Day celebrations in Kampala, Uganda on the 22nd of 
February 2014 and over 2000 printed copies of the scenarios were distributed. On October 6th 2014, the scenarios were presented 
to over 400 participants in the 2014 Nile Basin Development Forum (NBDF) in Nairobi, Kenya. From the outcome of the NBDF, 
it was evident that storylines are a very powerful policy influencing tool. We reached this conclusion because during the NBDF 
deliberations, the then Uganda Minister for Water and Environment, used the storylines to urge other Ministers to take action so 
as to enhance cooperation. He stated that he would prefer the Ejo Heza future and he is certain that none of the Water Minister’s 
present would want Miskeen to be the Nile Basin future. He therefore urged all the water ministers to convene a diplomatic 
mission to Egypt to inculcate Egypt to resume cooperation. All the other Ministers of Water present agreed and it was noted in 
the meeting minutes [9]. The storylines led to an agreement for joint action by the policy makers to resolve the long-standing 
issues. This was not achieved by the IPCC projections that had been concluded earlier.    
The IPCC projections may not have the same influence as the Nile Basin scenarios, because they are not tailored to the special 
needs of the Nile Basin. However, they are useful in increasing the utility of the storylines since they have undergone a rigorous 
development process involving climate change experts. The IPCC working group II’s contribution to the Fifth Assessment 
Report (WGII AR5) identified nine key risks for climate change, in Africa, as explained in table 2. The table also provides the 
potential for risk reduction through adaptation and mitigation, for the above-mentioned climate-induced risks [10]. To couple the 
Nile Basin scenarios with the IPCC projections, we analyzed each scenario against the IPCC key risks, adaptation issues and 
prospects (Table 2). 
Table 2. Table showing the IPCC key risks from climate change and the potential for risk reduction through mitigation and adaptation in Africa. Each key risk is 
characterized as very low, low, medium, high, or very high. The four Nile Basin scenarios are enumerated for every key risk and its subsequent IPCC adaptation 
issues and prospect. The content in the Nile Basin scenarios is derived from the storylines that were developed by the Nile Basin stakeholders in Jinja, Uganda 
and validated during the 2014 Nile Basin Development Forum in Nairobi, Kenya. (Source, modified IPCC Table 22-6 [2] and Nile Basin Scenarios [11]). 
 
Key Risks IPCC Adaptation Issues and 
Prospects 




       
1. Shifts in biome distribution, and 
severe impacts on wildlife due to 
diseases and species extinction 
(high confidence) 
 Very few adaptation options; 
migration corridors; protected 
areas; better management of 
natural resources 
 To address water scarcity 
issues, the water sector is 
fully privatised leading to 
overuse of the water without 
regard to the environment.  
 This leads to a rapid decline 
in flora and fauna and some 
are becoming extinct. 
 In response, the riparian 
states develop national 
strategies to slow down the 
extinction of endangered 
species. 
 However, poor governance, 
overuse of the water without 
regulation and the 
destruction of the forests 
leads to a significant decline 
of flora and fauna despite 
the present of national 
strategies to combat this. 
 The shifts in biome 
distribution is also caused 
by the high increase of 
fertiliser and chemical 
usage (that contaminate 
water) due to the low food 
productivity occasioned by 
droughts and the 
construction of large dams. 
 There is an over-reliance 
on the Nile Decision 
Support System (Nile- 
DSS).  
 However, the countries are 
surprised that despite 
having the Nile-DSS, they 
were ill-prepared for 
ecological surprises when 
their crops and livestock 
are severely threatened. 
 Climate change leads to so 
much suffering and as a result, 
Kazuri emerges. 
 Kazuri resolves the challenge 
of shifts in biome distribution 
through strong horizontal 
networks, self-organisation and 
community management of 
natural resources. 
 The communities build small 
water reservoirs at the local 
level so as to ensure that the 
portion of water for the 
environment is not depleted, 
rear their own livestock and 
rear fish in fish ponds to avoid 
over poaching and over fishing. 
 Through Kazuri the original 
balance is regained leading to 
preservation of biome. 
 At the end of 2020, the 
Greening the Nile 
Commission is established 
to combat the severe 
effects of climate change.  
 The basin is depleted and 
is at risk of becoming 
largely a desert. 
 Greening the Nile 
Commission works with 
the governments and the 
communities to restore the 
original biome distribution 
thus saving many species 
from extinction. 
 The Commission 
establishes the ecological 




 sea level 
rise 
 precipitation 
 sea surface 
temperature 
rise 
2. Compounded stress on water 
resources facing significant strain 
from overexploitation and 
degradation at present and 
increased demand in the future, 
with drought stress exacerbated in 
drought-prone regions of Africa 
(high confidence) 
 Reducing non-climate stressors on 
water resources 
 Strengthening institutional 
capacities for demand 
management, groundwater 
assessment, integrated water-
wastewater planning, and 
integrated land and water 
governance 
 Sustainable urban development 
 The Nile River Basin 
Commission is established 
without the agreement of all 
the riparian states. 
 This leads to divisions 
within the basin. 
 Countries result to unilateral 
actions. 
 Private sector is given 
autonomy to manage 
national water resources. 
 Private water boards 
monopolise the water sector. 
 Water becomes a very 
expensive commodity that 
the poor can barely afford. 
 This leads to civic unrest. 
 There is no basin 
organisation to regulate 
water use. 
 There is fear that the 
countries will go to war over 
the scarce resource.  
 In 2029, the Nile riparian 
states established the 
United Nile Republic 
(UNR), a supra-national 
body. 
 To effectively manage the 
Nile river resources, the 
UNR established the Nile 
River Basin Commission. 
 The Commission focused 
on downstream water 
supply. Industrial users 
were given the largest 
share of water because the 
priority of UNR was 
economic development. 
 This h led to inequity and a 
significant strain on the 
water resources 
 Climate change induced water 
stress leads to droughts and loss 
of confidence in the 
government to resolve the 
challenges. 
 As a last resort communities 
start to manage their own 
natural resources through water 
boards with no state regulation. 
 Indigenous knowledge is used 
to build small reservoirs and 
harvest rainwater. 
 Due to weak state regulation, 
resource rich regions remain 
rich while the poor ones 
become poorer. 
 Establishment of the 
Greening the Nile River 
Basin Commission in 
2020, for the joint 
management of the shared 
water resources. 
 Joint water project include 
construction of joint multi-
purpose dams, water 
condensation, reuse of 
waste water and 
desalination of the water 
from the Mediterranean 












3. Degradation of coral reefs results 
in loss of protective ecosystems 
and fishery stocks (medium 
confidence). 
 Few adaptation options; marine 
protected areas; conservation and 
protection; better management of 
natural resources 
 In Miskeen, by 2050 there is 
a significant loss of marine 
life. 
 The natural resources are 
not managed well – there is 
no basin body to manage the 
water resources and the 
riparian states deplete the 
natural resources within 
their territory. 
 The basin water is 
contaminated by chemicals 
and fertilisers. 
 There is an annual build-up 
of toxicity and salinity 
levels that is threatening 
marine life. 
 Kazuri focuses on small scale 
community actions to address 
the effects of climate change. 
 In the process, the role of the 
state is significantly diminished 
that regulatory and marine 
protection issues are barely 
addressed. 
 The communities around the 
Indian Ocean, Mediterranean 
Sea and Red sea manage their 
own land resources but the 
marine life is forgotten. 
 In 2020, the basin was 
experiencing high 
temperatures, sea level rise 
and salt water intrusion. 
 Greening the Nile 
Commission addressed all 
this challenges through 
better water resources 
management. 
 By 2050 marine life was 
no longer endangered. 







 sea level 
rise 
4. Reduced crop productivity 
associated with heat and drought 
stress, with strong adverse effects 
on regional, national, and 
household livelihood and food 
security, also given increased pest 
and disease damage and flood 
impacts on food system 
infrastructure (high confidence) 
 Technological adaptation 
responses  
 Enhancing smallholder access to 
credit and other critical 
production resources; 
Diversifying livelihoods 
 Strengthening institutions at local, 
national, and regional levels to 
support agriculture and gender-
oriented policy 
 Agronomic adaptation responses  
 Reduced crop productivity 
led to the cutting down of 
trees and cultivation of land 
designated for forests. 
 This led to significant land 
degradation, especially in 
the upstream countries. 
 The streams and rivers that 
were once permanent 
became seasonal and slowly 
dried up. 
 The forest cover reduced 
drastically. 
 By 2030, the Nile Basin is 
characterised by soil loss, 
 The Nile River Basin 
Commission (NRBC) 
invests in large-scale 
agricultural projects that 
lead to the production of 
enough food for the entire 
basin. 
 NRBC also hosts the Nile 
DSS which acts as an early 
warning advisory. 
 However, since climate 
change issues are very 
uncertain, the Nile-DSS 
does not sufficiently 
prepare the decision 
 Through the Kazuri citizen-
based collective intelligence 
knowledge hub, individual 
learn how to grow drought 
resistant crop varieties, water 
harvesting, reuse of the water, 
small scale irrigation systems 
and small reservoirs, safe 
fertilizers to use and how to 
compost. 
 This has led to increased crop 
productivity despite the 
unfavourable climate. 
 Kazuri is a market hub where 
excess agricultural produce is 
 In 2020, the Nile Basin 
was experiencing salt 
water intrusions, loss of 
our ground water 
resources, increased level 
of water scarcity and our 
desert area cover was 
increasing at a very 
alarming rate.  
 The crop productivity in 
the Northern parts of the 
Nile Basin (Egypt and 
Sudan) had immensely 
decreased.  
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Key Risks IPCC Adaptation Issues and 
Prospects 




       
massive flood events and 
long spells of drought. 
makers for ecological 
surprises. 
 Increased use of fertilisers 
and chemical leads to the 
production of enough food 
but at a very high cost to 
health.  
sold. 
 Kazuri also acts as an early 
warning advisory on floods and 
droughts and other weather 
conditions. 
Commission was 
established at the end of 
2020 and it worked very 
hard and reversed the 
climate change effects. 
 By 2050, the Nile Basin is 
food secure. 
5. Adverse effects on livestock linked 
to temperature rise and 
precipitation changes that lead to 
increased heat and water stress, 
and shifts in the range of pests and 
diseases, with adverse impacts on 
pastoral livelihoods and rural 
poverty (medium confidence) 
 Addressing non-climate stressors 
facing pastoralists.  
 Natural resource-based strategies 
such as reducing drought risk to 
pastoral livelihoods through use 
of forest goods and services hold 
potential. 
 By 2050, there is no water. 
The rivers and streams have 
dried up. 
 The pastoralists are highly 
affected because their 
livestock die and they have 
no other source of 
livelihoods. 
 By 2050, pastoralists are in 
despair because their leaders 
have not addressed the 
climate stressors facing 
them. 
 With the United Nile 
Republic in place, there 
were extensive irrigation 
schemes all over the basin 
and most of the basin 
population had moved to 
the cities.  
 Therefore the pastoralists 
changed their livelihood 
because they had no land 
to herd their livestock. 
 The pastoralists have formed 
their own group within the 
Kazuri knowledge hub where 
they learn from each other how 
to address the non-climate 
stressors facing them as their 
livestock are adversely 
affected. 
 Through Kazuri they replace 
their current herds with more 
resistant breeds. 
 They also start communal 
projects for planting trees and 
building water points. 
 By 2020 the livestock had 
significantly diminished. 
 By 2050, the quality and 
quantity of Nile waters had 
improved.  
 This is because of the great 
leadership of the Greening 
the Nile Commission. 
 Agriculture, livestock, 
have been effectively 
managed.  
 The Nile Basin protected 









6. Changes in the incidence and 
geographic range of vector- and 
water-borne diseases (medium 
confidence) 
 Achieving development goals 
 Vulnerability mapping and early 
warning systems 
 Coordination across sectors 
 • Sustainable urban development 
 Miskeen barely addresses 
the challenges of vector and 
water borne diseases. 
 With the increased usage 
of fertilizers and 
chemicals the basin’s 
surface and ground water 
is contaminated.  
 The basin also suffers 
from very high salinity 
and toxicity levels.  
 Unknown water –related 
infectious diseases seem 
to be emerging that the 
Nile DSS never 
forecasted.  
 Through the Kazuri 
knowledge hub citizens learn 
how to use safe farming 
practices that do not affect 
water quality. 
 They also have citizen sensors 
that they use to check water 
quality so that they act as early 
warning advisories on 
emerging vector and water 
borne diseases.  
 Diseases are detected early 
and managed. 
 The Commission also 
focused on green 
agricultural practices, such 
as post-harvest loss 
reduction, organic farming, 
and fish farming. 
  In the Energy sector, the 
Commission changed 
focus towards targeted 
clean energy solutions  








7. Undernutrition, with its potential 
for life-long impacts on health and 
development and its associated 
increase in vulnerability to 
malaria and diarrhoea diseases 
(medium confidence). 
 Early warning systems and 
vulnerability mapping (for 
targeted 
 interventions); diet 
diversification; coordination with 
food and 
 Agriculture sectors; improved 
public health functions to address 
underlying diseases 
 By 2050, the citizens cannot 
afford water and food, they 
are in despair. 
 Lack of a long-term 
perspective led the basin into 
this disparate state. 
 The riparian states have 
become so inward looking, 
compartmentalized and very 
short-sighted.  
 The food security and 
nutrition of the Nile citizens 
is in grave danger. 
 Food security is assured 
for the Nile Basin for the 
next century.  
 However, with the increase 
the usage of fertilizers and 
chemicals so as to increase 
production and fight 
agricultural pests, these 
chemicals and fertilizers 
have contaminated the 
basin’s surface and ground 
water. 
 Kazuru knowledge hub has an 
early warning and vulnerability 
mapping that helps reduce a 
number of climate change 
induced risks. 
 Through Kazuri citizens learn 
what the best crops to grow and 
buy to address the 
undernutrition challenge. 
 Through Kazuri communities 
plan to grow diverse crops 
depending on their comparative 
advantage and trade their 
excess produce. 
 Reduced crop productivity 
led to large import of food, 
malnourishment and 
millions dying due to lack 
of food.  
 The Commission also 
focused on green 
agricultural practices, such 
as post-harvest loss 
reduction, organic farming, 
and fish farming. 
 It also encouraged public-










8. Increased migration leading to 
human suffering, human rights 
violations, political instability and 
conflict (medium confidence) 
 Adaptation deficit to current 
flood and drought risk; effective 
adaptation includes sustainable 
land management and 
modification of land use, drought 
relief, flood control and effective 
regional and national policy and 
legislative environment that 
allows for flexible adaptation 
responses. 
 Water scarcity causes many 
Nile Basin citizens to 
migrate to water secure 
places. 
 Floods force some of them 
to leave their homes. 
 The citizens are not prepared 
for the disasters. 
 Migration leads to suffering 
of the citizens, political 
unrest and conflicts for the 
scarce resources. 
 The Nile Basin citizens are 
enjoying the benefits of 
having a single currency, 
one Government 
managing the entire basin 
and one passport.  
 There are no restrictions 
on movement and the 
borders have been 
dismantled.   
 At the end of 2050, there 
are extensive irrigation 
schemes in the Basin.  
 Most of the Nile basin 
population has been moved 
to the cities to pave way 
for large scale agricultural 
investments. 
 Kazuri focuses on local 
management of resources and 
through its success migration is 
reduced significantly. 
 People are closer to their 
community and these strong 
networks sustain them and 
encourage them to stay within 
their localities. 
 Subsequently, when the issue of 
equity is not addressed, Kazuri 
starts to experience a migration 
of people from the resource 
poor areas to the resource rich 
areas. 
 Ejo Heza has been 
successful in restoring the 
basin, reducing the impacts 
of floods and droughts and 
introduced sustainable land 
management practices. 
 The Nile Basin citizens 
have their basic needs met 
and they can make a living 
out of the Nile Basin 
resources. 
  This the Commission has 
curbed the migration 
challenge. 








9. Sea level rise and extreme weather 
events disrupt transport systems, 
production systems, infrastructure, 
public services (water, education, 
health, sanitation), especially in 
informal areas (flooding) (medium 
confidence) 
 Limited options for migration 
away from flood prone localities 
Enhanced urban management and 
land use control would reduce 
both vulnerability and exposure 
to risks; would require policy 
review, significant capacity 
development and enforcement.  
 Miskeen barely addresses 
the challenges of sea level 
rise. 
 To address the challenge of 
sea level rise, Umoja 
focuses on hard 
infrastructural options that 
are expensive, need 
technical knowledge and 
are not always 
environmentally 
sustainable. 
 Through Kazuri, communities 
at the coastal areas focus on 
developing low-cost soft 
protective coastal infrastructure 
options could reduce risk of sea 
level rise. 
 Greening the Nile 
Commission’s first 
assignment was to reduce 
risks of sea level rise and 
sat intrusion at the Nile 
Delta. 
 It was successful in 
addressing this because of 
its community led 
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4. Discussion 
At the start of the coupling process, we were not certain that the two products could be combined. This is because they were 
developed at different timeframes, with different stakeholders for completely different purposes. In addition, one approach led to 
the development of qualitative scenarios in the form of storylines and the other led to projections. Another concern was the scale 
and focus area, one was developed for the entire world with a focus on Africa and the other one for a river basin. The projections 
were developed exclusively on climate change whereas the Nile Basin scenarios focused on three driving factors. Climate change 
was only one of these factors. Combining the two, we thought, would be a great challenge. However, we were surprised at how 
the two pieces fitted so well together. The storylines seemed to be addressing the key risks, in two ways. First, they gave a very 
detailed governance and information context within which the key risks may be embedded, in the future. This was completely 
lacking in the IPCC projections. In addition, it was surprising how the two seemed to communicate the same message. Second, 
the IPCC adaptation issues and prospects were also addressed in great detail in the storylines. 
From the coupling exercise four key findings emerged. First, we realised that from coupling, you can easily identify a 
recurrent theme, which may form a basis for prioritising further action. In this current coupling exercise, the significance of 
climate governance became apparent to us. As we analysed the table, governance was the central theme that mainstreamed in all 
the scenarios. It was striking that the scenarios seemed to be substantiating the IPCC projections and there seemed to be no 
conflict in regard to the plausible futures. The same risks identified in the IPCC projections were the same risks identified in all 
the four scenarios. What was missing in the IPCC projections was plausible futures in regard to the governance structure that 
may be adopted, to address the climate induced disasters. Different governance structures yielded different results. The storylines 
combined with the IPCC projections communicate a consistent and strong message on the dangers of weak governance and its 
impact on the adaptation to climate induced disasters. The projections alone could not communicate this message. Before 
coupling the Nile Basin scenarios and the IPCC projections, it was not clear what the core problem was. But with the 
combination of the two, the storyline was very clear - good governance is key to the effective climate change risk reduction.  
Secondly, we realised that coupling of scenarios may be used to check for consistency and plausibility. One of the major 
challenges that storylines face is the test of consistency and plausibility. We recall, during the NBDF, one of the Ministers of 
Water asked how we developed the storylines, with what data, with whom and how can we establish that they are plausible. In 
our response, we explained that the scenarios were developed by a multi-disciplinary team of experts, who checked for 
consistency and plausibility through an iterative process. It was hard to determine that the scenarios were credible, consistent and 
plausible, to policy makers who have been accustomed to data and quantitative information. IPCC projections also face 
credibility concerns because the world is becoming increasingly uncertain that many predictions fail the test of accuracy. If there 
is one inconsistent projection, the credibility of the entire IPCC projections is questioned. Hence coupling the two, increased the 
credibility of both products. Since one product was reinforcing another and did not contain conflicting information, it was a 
strong indicator of consistency and plausibility.  Different products, on the same subject-matter that are developed in different 
contexts, may be compared through coupling, so as to check for consistency and plausibility. 
Third, coupling brings to light some of the emerging issues that may be lost in projections or not emphasised in the storylines. 
With the storylines, we realised that based on how the story was written, there was a danger of emerging issues being construed, 
downplayed or lost. For example, the emerging issue on human migration was depicted in the following lines of the Umoja 
scenario: “The Nile Basin citizens are enjoying the benefits of having a single currency, one Government managing the entire 
basin and one passport.” It is not easy to drawn the linkages between a single passport and migration problems, when reading the 
excerpt, at the first instance. However, when reading the same story against a backdrop of the IPCC projections on increased 
human migration that will result in human suffering, the story is contextualised and is better understood. Some of the emerging 
issues that were mentioned in the storylines but were not that apparent were: the impact of climate change on human security, the 
contribution of climate change to violet conflicts in the Nile Basin and the issue of human migration (whether internal or cross-
boundary). The coupling exercise led to more clarity, in regard to the emerging issues. 
Lastly, coupling helps to ascertain the causal effect connections. The projections by themselves failed to communicate the 
causality. From the original table it seemed that the causal relationships were very simple. However, as we combined the stories 
and the projections it became apparent that the causal effect relationships are extremely complex. For instance, the cause of shifts 
in biome distribution was global warming, sea level rise, sea surface temperature and precipitation, according to the original 
IPCC table. However, when you couple the scenarios and the projections you realise that the shifts in biome distribution is also 
caused by construction of large dams to address the food productivity and undernutrition challenge, which lead to trapping the 
silt upstream, and leads to poor soils downstream and decline in productivity, that leads to the increase in use of chemicals and 
fertilisers which filter into the water system therefore causing severe impacts on plants and animals. Projections by themselves 
cannot tell this complex story. However, they help to develop a framework through which the story can be effectively 
communicated, thereby increasing the utility of the scenarios and the projections. 
5. Conclusions 
At the beginning of this paper, we argued that scenarios are powerful tools for influencing decision making on climate-change 
induced risk reduction. Unfortunately, this potential has barely been tapped. In addition, we argued that the Nile Basin decision 
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makers rarely take account of scenarios in their decision making processes. Thereafter, we explained why projections that are 
applied in isolation or storylines that are applied with no projections, might not be effective in influencing decision-making. We 
also argued that coupling of scenarios in the form of storylines and climate change projections, is essential in increasing the 
utility of both outputs. Based on our analysis, IPCC projections were considered the best scenarios to be coupled with the Nile 
Basin 2050 scenarios. 
The findings we have presented suggest that scenarios coupled with projections hold a promise in increasing the utility of both 
the scenarios and the projections. Our findings are important in supporting scientists, water resources managers and policy 
analysts who develop scenarios to influence decision making. Our findings are also important for decision makers as policy 
influencing and decision support tools when dealing with deep uncertainty.  This study offers an innovative solution to the 
aspiration by the developers that the scenarios and projections they develop are consistent, plausible and will eventually 
influence policy. Our study also raises important questions and suggestions on how to couple scenarios and projections. Since 
this is a very new area and very few researchers have coupled scenarios in the past, we did not find an existing framework to 
guide the process.  As a result of conducting this research, we propose more emphasis on the social perspectives of scenario 
development. It would be fruitful if future scenarios do not focus only on projections but also the story that supports the 
projections and the process that led to the development of the scenarios.  Future research should focus on developing a 
framework to support coupling of scenarios with system models and projections. 
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